




(forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Agency) 
  
 According to the Aristotelean definition, the human being is the rational animal.  
Many would for this reason reject it, contending that the rational patterns exhibited by 
human behavior and cognition are present, even if to a lesser degree, in non-humans as 
well.  One way of defending the definition is to argue that the practical and theoretical 
capacities of humans constitute a distinctive form of agency: rational agency.  Unlike 
many of the topics in this handbook, this is a relatively unexplored area of research.  
There is no extensive literature to survey and no warring factions whose battle-lines 
might be usefully charted.  Since many philosophers simply have no idea what a rational 
form of agency would be, this entry will focus on the very idea. 
In a suitably broad sense of activity, one might say that activity marks the 
distinction between the animate and the inanimate.  Living things are active insofar as 
they grow and reproduce.  Animals are self-movers, and as such are active in a more 
demanding sense.  Self-movement can be understood in terms of an animal’s acting on 
the basis of perception in pursuit of its aims. The network of capacities underlying this 
activity is constitutive of animal agency. But animals are passive in a way in which 
humans are not.  Whereas we are capable of stepping-back and reflecting on the 
goodness of our aims and making a judgment about what to do on the basis of this 
reflection, non-rational animals are driven entirely by their aims.  (See Korsgaard 
2009.)  Similarly, a non-rational animal is not capable of believing on the basis of 
consideration of what to believe, but rather simply believes what it, so to speak, finds 
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itself believing.  This is to gesture in the direction of the idea of a distinctively rational 
agency. 
We can begin to flesh the idea out by considering the nature of the capacities that 
manifest themselves in episodes of rational reflection.  Such episodes involve what one 
might call self-conscious engagement with normative questions, questions 
paradigmatically of whether to do x or believe p.  If a poker player is deciding whether or 
not to call a large, surprising bet, she is asking herself questions about, e.g.,  what her 
opponent’s behavior on prior rounds of betting indicates, the significance (and 
ingenuousness) of his body language, what she knows about his general tendencies as a 
player, what impact her possible actions will have on her ‘table image’, whether what 
might ordinarily be an overly cautious fold would be prudent given how close she is to 
‘making the money’, etc.  These reflections require the possession of the concepts that 
figure in the specification both of the actions being considered and the facts on which 
the relative wisdom of the various choices depend.   
 Someone who engages in such reflection does not merely manifest the possession 
of concepts in the sense in which a dog, who reacts excitedly upon seeing his master 
reach for the leash, manifests the concepts of ‘leash’ and ‘walk’.  A rational subject’s 
manner of possession of these concepts is linked to an understanding of the 
contributions they make to truth-conditions, to some awareness of the evidential 
significance of their exemplification, and to a capacity to grasp and evaluate the 
corresponding propositions.  These are abilities that it is not unreasonable to think are 
limited to language users.  We are, after all, unwilling to credit someone with thoughts 
of the sort that figure in the above reflections if the thinker displays no mastery of the 
linguistic forms that are used to express them.  
 3 
 Acts of reflection also require the possession of the concepts that articulate the 
form of the questions themselves.  Our gambler must understand the bearing of the 
considerations she brings to consciousness on questions of whether to believe 
something, e.g., that her opponent is bluffing, and so whether to do something, e.g., call 
the bet.  She must thus possess the concepts of belief and of action.  Furthermore, she 
must understand the very idea of considerations showing a proposition to be one that 
should be believed, i.e., to be true, and the very idea of considerations showing an action 
should be performed, i.e. to be good.  For this understanding is an element in the 
relevant forms of rational responsiveness.  The subject must thus have some (very 
general understanding) of the framework of theoretical and practical justification.  We 
might summarize these points by saying that rational reflection depends upon the sort 
of grasp of concepts that makes it possible to explicitly consider normative questions.  It 
is, in this sense, a self-conscious activity: a rational deliberator understands what she’s 
doing as aiming to make up her mind about what to believe or do. 
  Suppose this much is granted.  Suppose that it is also granted that non-human 
animals lack the cognitive wherewithal to engage in rational reflection, so understood.  
Finally, suppose it is allowed that such reflection substantially affects the lives of the 
deliberators.  It would still not follow that humans possess anything that deserves to be 
called a distinctive form of agency.  For it might nonetheless be contended that both 
human and non-human animals act on the basis of prior thought in the same sense, that 
the difference between them is only in how conceptually sophisticated those thoughts 
are.  This, some will argue, is just a difference of degree.  And so what we really have is 
just ordinary animal agency, which varies in the contents of the associated mental states 
according to the relevant creature’s cognitive abilities.  The nature of human thought 
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and action and the way the former affects the latter is not, it will be concluded, tied to 
any of the specifically rational capacities that we are now supposing belong exclusively 
to human beings.  Thus we still have no case for or even a clear conception of rational 
agency. 
 Our imagined skeptic of rational agency is right about this much: for the 
possession of a network of capacities to amount to a form of agency, their exercise 
would have to be the central element in a distinct kind of change, distinct in the way 
that, for example, growth and self-movement are distinct kinds of change.  One might 
express this point by saying that for rationality to amount to a kind of agency is for there 
to be a distinctive form of causation: rational causation.  (If ‘causation’ seems too 
metaphysically loaded, then read: “distinctive form of causal-explanation: rational 
causal-explanation”.) But what does this mean? 
 Deliberation culminates, in ideal cases, in the making up of one’s mind: to do x, 
or to believe that p.  These conclusions are based on the reasons for action and belief 
that proved decisive.  We often ask after these bases: “Why did you call the bet?”.  
“Because I thought he was bluffing.”  “Why did you think he was bluffing?”.  “Because he 
always smiles like that when he’s bluffing.”  Here the gambler gives rational 
explanations of her action and belief.  It is characteristic of such explanations that 
what’s offered as explanation is at the same time justification.  It is an explanation that 
consists of a justification.  But it is not just a justification, it is her justification: what, at 
the time, the deliberator took to justify the relevant belief or action.  It was, according to 
the explanation given, in virtue of her taking the stated reason to justify that the action 
was performed or the belief adopted.   
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 It has vexed scores of philosophers working in various subfields to say more 
precisely what it is for the justification to be hers. Donald Davidson famously points out 
that (in the practical case) it is not just a matter of the action being caused by the agent’s 
desiring an end and believing that the relevant action will bring the end about. His 
infamous mountain climber does not let go of the rope, killing his companion, in order 
to save himself; rather, the recognition that he could save himself by doing so stuns him, 
thereby causing him to let go. (Davidson 1963)  This (‘deviant’) causation circumvents 
rather than serves his agency, even as it leads to the realization of his aim. 
 We have, on the one hand, paradigmatic exercises of rational powers: the making 
up of one’s mind to do x or to believe p on the basis of considerations.  We have, on the 
other hand, certain causal phenomena: someone performs an action or adopts a belief 
for reasons.  There is, apart from any interest in our topic here, a general sense that we 
are still in the dark as to how to understand the connection between the former and the 
latter.  There would be rational agency if the solution to this mystery went as follows: 
facts of the former sort constitute facts of the latter sort.  That is, if the causal 
connection between a reason and the action or belief that rests on it were nothing 
beyond the exercise of rational powers—specifically the power to make up one’s mind 
about what to do or believe on the basis of considerations—then there would be a 
manner of bringing things about that belonged exclusively to rational creatures.  
Rational agency, then, is (or would be) the power to decide normative questions in a 
manner so as to constitute facts about the causes (or, if you prefer, causal explanations) 
of certain events and states.  For a subject to accuse the butler of doing it because the 
butler lacked an alibi or to believe that the butler did it because the butler lacked an alibi 
is, on this view, nothing over and above the subject’s viewing the action of accusing the 
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butler as to be done or the proposition that the butler did it as to be believed in light of 
his lacking an alibi. 
 According to this proposal, in saying that someone is x-ing or believes that p for 
the reason R, we attribute to her a normative judgment that x-ing is to be done or p is to 
be believed in light of R.  This is closely connected to the ‘Guise of the Good’ thesis, 
according to which acting involves a normative judgment that the action is good.  Here 
the idea is that in acting for a reason one performs the action under the guise of R’s 
contributing to its goodness.  A defense of this approach will thus need to reply to those 
who contend that someone might act for a reason they knew did not establish the 
goodness of the relevant action—as, it might be contended, a certain sort of akratic 
does—or for a reason they took to establish the badness of an action—as, it might be 
contended, an aspiring super-villain does.  (See the essays in Tenenbaum 2010 for a 
recent discussion.) 
The thesis that in inferring p from q, one draws the conclusion in the light of the 
support q provides p is referred to by Paul Boghossian as the Taking Condition. 
(Boghossian 2014)  Here too defense will be required: against the critics of the Taking 
Condition, who argue variously that there is no way of spelling it out without regress, 
that it requires too much conceptual sophistication, that it makes false claims about the 
phenomenology of inference, or that it ignores the possibility of the doxastic equivalent 
of akrasia.  (See, e.g., McHugh and Way 2006.) 
The most controversial aspect of the thesis of rational agency is the central causal 
claim: that certain practical and theoretical normative judgments constitute the causal-
explanatory nexus between the reason and the relevant act or state. This idea runs 
deeply against the grain of conventional thinking about causation, according to which 
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the obtaining of a causal connection is the wrong sort of thing to be constitutively 
dependent on a subject’s representing the world a certain way.  It is, of course, 
uncontroversial that a subject’s representation can influence and be influenced by the 
world.  But rational agency, as I suggest it must be understood, involves the idea that a 
subject’s representing R as conferring to-be-done-ness on an action or to-be-believed-
ness on a proposition constitutes the obtaining of a causal connection between R and 
the relevant action or belief.  The resultant conception of causation must be defended.  
(See Marcus 2012). 
To think of people as possessing distinctively rational agency is to see them as 
authors of a distinctive kind of change, one that is tied essentially to their rational 
sensitivity to reasons.  The agent, in concluding that x is to be done on the basis of R 
thereby is x-ing on the basis or R.  The subject, in concluding that p is to be believed on 
the basis of R thereby believes p on the basis R.  It follows that there is no gap between R 
and the action or belief—no ‘Reasons Gap’, as we can call it.  It’s not that, say, one judges 
that one should put out the trash and this causes, via non-rational mechanisms, certain 
bodily movements that accomplish one’s aim.  One’s judgment that it is to be done 
constitutes the fact that one is taking out the trash.  And so it is precisely this judgment 
that then makes it possible to perform further actions because one is taking out the 
trash.  (See Thompson 2004.) The conclusion of practical reasoning, as Aristotle held, is 
an action.  It is the action of x-ing itself that is constituted by the subject’s judgment that 
x is to be done.  Similarly, it is not that one judges that one should believe that it’s 
Tuesday, and that this then contributes to the formation (in an optimal case) of the 
disposition in which believing that it’s Tuesday consists.  One’s judgment that it is to be 
believed constitutes the fact that one believes it’s Tuesday.  And so it is precisely this 
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judgment that makes it possible to then infer that it’s not a weekend because it’s 
Tuesday.  The conclusion of theoretical reasoning is belief, and thus it is belief that p 
itself that is constituted by the subject’s judgment that p is to be believed.  Human 
action and belief are, according to the thesis of rational agency, themselves 
manifestations of the very capacities exercised in explicit acts of critical reflection.   
The thesis of rational agency also eliminates what we can call “The Knowledge 
Gap”.  To accept the gap is to think that what one knows simply in x-ing for the reason R 
or knows simply in believing that p for the reason R falls short of the fact that one is x-
ing because R or believes that p because R.  To reject this gap is thus to hold that one 
who is x-ing on the basis of R or who believes that p on the basis of R knows, simply in 
doing so, that she is x-ing because R or believes that p because R.  Anscombe’s Intention 
begins from the assumption that there is no Knowledge Gap.  She argues that someone 
who performs an action can ‘give application’ to the rational ‘why?’, and not on the basis 
of observation or evidence. (Anscombe 2000.)  The agent, on her view, knows non-
empirically what she’s doing and why (in the relevant sense) she’s doing it.  This claim 
can be made with equal plausibility about belief and our reasons for belief.  Insofar as 
action and belief are constituted by judgment, we can begin to make sense of this 
knowledge.  Since they are constituted by normative judgments, rational creatures have 
the kind of epistemic access to action and belief that they have to their own judgments.  
And if there is nothing more to a causal connection between someone’s x-ing for the 
reason that R or believing that p for the reason that R than her viewing R as conferring 
to-be-done-ness on x-ing or to-be-believed-ness on p, then this non-empirical 
knowledge of our reasons would be intelligible.  The subject can speak with special 
authority about the question of why the action is performed or the proposition believed 
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because the relevant facts are constituted by how she herself takes matters to be, 
specifically: her taking the action as to be done or the proposition as to be believed in 
light of the justification provided by the relevant reasons.   
It should now be evident that there are many challenges facing the defender of 
rational agency.  As mentioned above, it will be argued that people act and believe 
against their normative judgments, that such judgments are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for belief and action.  The Aristotelean doctrine that action is the conclusion of 
practical reasoning can seem especially problematic, given that people may never get 
around to doing what they sincerely and non-akratically judge is to be done, and that 
people may make such judgments where the relevant action simply cannot ever be 
performed.  Others will hear in the doctrine the implausible suggestion that what we do 
takes place inside the mind.  But, as I have emphasized, the idea is rather that an action 
must be understood as itself a manifestation of (as opposed merely to an effect of) 
human practical rationality, as the agent’s answer to the question “What should I do?”.  
Actions are, on this view, elements of the space of reasons, and not simply via the proxy 
of causally efficacious psychological states.    
Though Anscombe and those who follow her take the rejection of the Knowledge 
Gap as a datum to be explained, others would reject it outright.  People who are self-
deceived might be described as not knowing why they believe and act as they do.  
Implicit bias might be interpreted as a matter of possessing beliefs of which one had no 
awareness.  And an agent who acts, e.g., selfishly, might prefer to believe a more 
favorable account of her own action and this in turn might, through selective attention 
and motivated reasoning, lead her to adopt one.  To claim as an advantage a superior 
position from which to explain our non-empirical knowledge of our actions, beliefs and 
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the reasons on which they are based, an advocate of rational agency would have to deal 
with the apparent threat to the datum posed by these sorts of cases.  
 If acting and believing for reasons require—or, more precisely, if the correct 
application of the corresponding linguistic forms to people require—that the agents and 
believers possess sophisticated conceptual understanding, then it follows that non-
rational beings do not (in the same sense) believe or act for reasons.  Some account will 
then be required of what we are talking about when we describe a dog, e.g., as running 
down the stairs because its master called for him.  Such descriptions impute to animals 
actions performed on the basis of thought.  It is unlikely that any view of the sort I 
describe in this entry will find a widespread following until a plausible account of non-
rational thought and action can be formulated.  This remains the most significant 
challenge for advocates of rational agency.   
Although a detailed account has yet to be given, the form that a satisfying 
response will take is clear.  John McDowell argues that although rational and non-
rational creatures are perceptually sensitive to their environment, the perception of 
rational creatures necessarily draws into operation conceptual capacities that the non-
rational lack.  (McDowell 1994.)  Continuing along this path we might say that whereas 
thought quite generally puts the thinker in cognitive contact with the world, mediating 
between perception and action, when a species or individual acquires the suite of 
cognitive abilities that constitute rationality, their perception, thought and action are 
not merely supplemented with additional contents, but transformed into qualitatively 
different capacities.  When a rational creature sees, thinks and acts, she exercises 
distinctively rational conceptual powers (in the manner sketched above).  A successful 
elaboration of this idea must exhibit the commonalities that make rational and non-
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rational agency instances of a common genus and the differences that make them 
distinct species of that genus.  (Cf., Boyle forthcoming.) 
Above, I said that episodes of rational deliberation involve self-conscious 
engagement with normative questions.  Such episodes are marked by the requirement of 
conceptual sophistication and culminate, in ideal cases, in causation-constituting 
normative judgments that utilize this sophistication and exhibit the just-discussed 
rational self-consciousness.  But there is no requirement that such judgments be 
preceded by deliberation.  In fact, it is surely the exception.  Work needs to be done to 
understand the nature of these judgments, and what underlies the mutual 
interdependence of their salient characteristics—that they require conceptual 
sophistication, that they are made as if in answer to questions about what to believe or 
do, that they put the rational being in a position to speak authoritatively about the 
relevant causal matters.  But this further understanding will not contradict the self-
evident truth that the sorts of judgment in which deliberation culminate are sometimes 
made without deliberation. It’s not as if someone whose deliberation leads him to say 
that p must be true in light of R is expressing something different from another who 
makes the same claim without deliberation.  
 Note that it does not follow from the fact that much of what we believe and do for 
reasons is not the result of episodes of deliberation that someone who is incapable of 
engaging in conscious episodes of deliberation could make the relevant judgments. It is 
only to say that those judgments, with the interlocking characteristics that we 
introduced by way of considering rational deliberation, can occur even without such 
deliberation. In fact, it is highly implausible that a creature that is incapable of explicitly 
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taking up normative questions could nonetheless possess the ability to make judgments 
that are the taking of stands on them. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that this sketch of the very idea of rational agency 
wards off two common misunderstandings of the thesis that humans are a distinctive 
kind of agent in virtue of their rationality.  First, it is not equivalent to the absurd thesis 
that humans are unerring optimizers and Spock-like cogitators.  And not because these 
are ideals of which we fall short.  Rather, these archetypes simply do not personify the 
rationality that figures in the thesis under discussion.  Rational, in the relevant sense, 
does not contrast with irrational, but with non-rational.  Second, the thesis is not that, 
over and above the exercise of non-rational cognitive powers, we are also capable of 
exercising rational cognitive powers.  This flawed conception would be that while we go 
about our ordinary business, we think and act in the manner of the non-rational.  Then, 
in occasional episodes of critical reflection, we exercise a capacity that is exclusively our 
own. These exercises can then impact what we believe and do, where these thoughts and 
actions are still understood as of the sorts of states and events that figure in the lives of 
animals more generally.  The thesis is rather that the thoughts and actions of human 
beings quite generally are themselves manifestations of the very capacities that 
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